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STATECRAFT: DESIGNING FOREIGN POLICY
DIPLOMACY 6181
SPRING 2018

Professor: Ann Marie Murphy
E-mail: Annmarie.murphy@shu.edu
Tel: 973-275-2258

Office: 135 McQuaid Hall
Office Hours: Tues. 4-5 and by
appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION
This course will introduce students to the study of statecraft: the design of strategies to
achieve foreign policy goals; the choice of policy instruments within these strategies; and
an assessment of their relative utility in achieving national objectives. This class begins
by exploring key theoretical underpinnings of statecraft such as bargaining, power,
threats, promises and cost/benefit analysis. It then examines different tools of statecraft,
including strategic bombing, economic sanctions, foreign aid and trade, targeted killings,
and propaganda. The course analyzes the objectives typically associated with each policy
tool, the conditions under which they are most likely to be effective in accomplishing
these goals, and debates regarding the proper way to measure effectiveness. Using the
conceptual tools studied in class, all students will craft a foreign affairs strategy on a
topic of their choice.
REQUIRMENTS
All students are expected to come to class having read the assigned material and prepared
to discuss it in an authoritative manner. Class participation is an important component of
this class, and will account for 10% of each student’s grade. In addition, there will be a
take home midterm that will be handed out on February 27 and due on March 13. The
midterm will count for 35% of the class grade. Students will also write a 20 page
strategy paper and present their conclusions to the class. For this paper, students will
choose a foreign policy case, frame the policy in terms of the analytical tools studied in
class. The paper and presentation will account for 45% and 10% respectively.
Presentations will be made at the end of the semester and papers are due on May 8, the
last day of class.
This course is roughly divided into two sections. The first half of the class is devoted to
studying the foundations and tools of statecraft. The second half of class following
spring break is devoted to constructing the policy paper. Particularly during this part of
the course, you will need to simultaneously (1) read the assigned text, (2) conduct
research on foreign (and domestic) policy of your chosen case, and (3) gradually design a
viable cost-effective strategy. In order to accomplish the task of designing a strategy we
will devote the first part of each class to analyzing the assigned texts. The second part of
the class will be devoted to applying the material discussed in that class to your concrete
case. Thus, you will not only have to closely read the assigned texts before each class but
you will also have to know whether a specific goal is desirable/viable and whether a
specific foreign policy tool is available and useful for achieving your country’s specific
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goal(s). I will assess your progress weekly because each week at least 30% of students
will discuss their work, accomplishments as well as challenges.
Case studies must be chosen in consultation with the instructor, so it behooves all of you
to begin thinking about the country you want to research as soon as possible. The paper
must include a wide variety of primary and secondary sources and include proper citation
of sources and a complete bibliography. The structure of the foreign affairs strategy laid
out in the Deibel volume will serve as a basis for the paper, which must include the
following:
Two major foreign policy objectives;
The international strategic environment as it relates to your country’s objectives;
The regional strategic environment as it relates to your country’s objectives;
The domestic context for strategy;
Foreign policy instruments to be used;
Possible restraints;
Linking ends and means.
In addition to the assigned materials, students should keep abreast of major foreign policy
issues by reading the New York Times and magazines such as The Economist on a regular
basis. The instructor will reference current policy issues to illustrate analytical readings
throughout the semester, and it is imperative that students be up to date.
Academic Integrity
Plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty will be reported to the administration, and
will result in a lowered or failing grade for the course and may lead to dismissal from the School
of Diplomacy. See university and school standards for academic conduct here:
http://www.shu.edu/offices/student-life/community-standards/community-standards.cfm
http://www.shu.edu/academics/diplomacy/academic-conduct.cfm.
Students with Disabilities
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act,
students at Seton Hall University who have a disability may be eligible for accommodations in
this course. Should a student require such accommodation, he or she must self-identify at the
Office of Disability Support Services (DSS), Room 67, Duffy Hall, provide documentation of
said disability, and work with DSS to develop a plan for accommodations. The contact person is
Ms. Diane Delorenzo at (973) 313-6003.

JANUARY 23
CLASS 1
INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS STATECRAFT
AND HOW WILL IT BE STUDIED IN THIS COURSE?
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David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp.
3-28.
Key Questions: What is statecraft and why should we study it? What are the four key
types of statecraft discussed by Baldwin? What is power, and why is it so central to the
study of foreign policy? What is the distinction between power resources and influence?
JANUARY 30
CLASS 2
FOUNDATIONS OF STATECRAFT: POLICY
ENGINEERING, THREATS AND PROMISES
Philip Zeilkow, “Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again”
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1994) pp. 143-171. Focus on his 7
components of foreign policy-making, which begins on p. 155.
David A. Baldwin, “Thinking About Threats” and “The Power of Positive Sanctions” in
Paradoxes of Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989) pp. 45-57, and 58-81.
Alexander George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Westview Press,), pp. 721
Key Questions: Under what conditions are threats/promises more costly? Are positive
or negative sanctions necessarily more effective than the other? What type of
information would Baldwin contend a policy-maker needs to know in order before
choosing how to attempt to exert influence in a given situation? Do we need different
conceptual frameworks to analyze military and economic statecraft? What three types of
knowledge does Zeilkow contend good policy-making requires? What are the seven
components of his policy policy-making process? What is coercive diplomacy? Is it
synonymous with military statecraft? Can promises be a component of coercive
strategy?
Case: Iranian Nuclear Chess: After the Deal, Robert Litwak, available at:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/irans-nuclear-chess-after-the-deal
Note: this is a long, 130 page report, albeit with lots of charts, footnotes etc. Read the
following, although the entire report is very useful. Executive Summary p. 7- 11 and the
Introduction p. 13-19. Please note that we will return repeatedly to this case, so if your
workload is fairly light now at the beginning of the semester, READ ahead!
As you read the case, apply the readings to it. Zeilkow makes a distinction between
policy objectives and policy preferences—identify them in this case. What tools of
statecraft were used to achieve the nuclear deal? Identify the threats and promises used
in this case to arrive at the deal from both the U.S. and Iranian perspective.
FEBRUARY 6
CLASS 3
TOOLS OF STATECRAFT I: THE
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DEBATE
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Required:
Stefanie Ann Lenway, “Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of
Statecraft,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2, (Spring 1988) pp. 397-426. NO
need to read the Megarian Case.
Risa A. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?” Security
Studies 11, No 4, (Summer 2002) p. 1-50.
Arne Tostensen, Beate Bull, “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? World Politics, Vol 54, No.
3, April 2002, pp. 373-403.
John Mueller and Karl Mueller, “The Sanctions of Mass Destruction?” Foreign Affairs,
May/June 1999. pp. 43-53.
Emma Ashford, “Not so Smart Sanctions” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2016.
NYT on North Korea Sanctions TBA
Key Questions: What is the precise logic of the process by which sanctions are designed
to achieve the goals of the sender country? How do HSE define and measure state goals
and the success of sanctions episodes? Lenway compares and contrasts the frameworks
employed by HSE and Baldwin, particularly the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness
of sanctions. Which one do you find more compelling for policy-makers? Brooks calls
for a more nuanced approach to sanctions, focusing on targeted sanctions designed to
impose costs on politically influential groups. How does a country’s regime type affect
the likelihood that different types of sanctions will be effective? What are smart
sanctions? What are some of the difficulties of implementing smart sanctions? What
costs do sanctions impose on the sending country? Does Emma Ashford believe that the
sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine are smart? Do you agree with
her assessment of a) how to frame the goals of the countries imposing sanctions and b)
their effectiveness? There is a tendency in the literature to view economic sanctions as a
more “humane” tool of statecraft than military force. Do Mueller and Mueller agree?
Recommended:
David, A Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” International
Security, 24, No. 3, (winter 1999/2000) pp. 80-107.
Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work” International Security 22, No
2 (Fall 1997) pp. 90-136.
Kimberly Ann Elliot, “The Sanctions Galss: Half Full or Completely Empty?
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998) pp. 50-65.
Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, International Security 22,
No 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 90-136.
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FEBRUARY 13
CLASS 4
TOOLS OF STATECRAFT II: FOREIGN AID,
TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE
David A. Baldwin, “Foreign Trade” and “Foreign Aid” in Economic Statecraft
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 206-222. and pp. 290-310. NOTE
THAT YOU ARE ONLY ASSIGNED PARTS OF BALDWIN’S CHAPTERS ON
TRADE AND AID
Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa” International Organization,
Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 123-144. NOTE THAT YOU CAN SKIP THE
REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND FOCUS ON HIS QUESTIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS.
Michael Froman, The Strategic Logic of Trade: New Rules of the Road for the Global
Market,” Foreign Affairs, 93, 6, Nov-Dec, 2014. The USTR making a case for the TPP.
Richard Katz, “Mutually Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between
China and Japan” Foreign Affairs, 2013.
Mark Strauss, “How China’s Rare Earth Weapon Went from Boom to Bust”
NYT Articles on Russia and Gazprom’s cut-off of natural gas to Ukraine.
“Rogue to Vogue? Despite its Reputation, Chinese Aid is Quite Effective” The
Economist
https://www.economist.com/news/china/21730195-new-study-reassesses-notion-chinabad-donor-despite-its-reputation-chinese-aid
Article on North Korea Sanctions TBA
Recommended:
Adam Segal, “Chinese Computer Games: Keeping Safe in Cyberspace” Foreign Affairs,
91, 2, April, May 2012.
Key Questions: What are supply and influence effects of international trade and the
logic by which they exert influence? What are strategic goods? How should one
conceptualize the role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy? How should the
effectiveness of foreign aid be measured? Conditionality in foreign aid is a controversial
topic. What are the arguments made by each side in this debate, and which ones do you
find more persuasive? What is the “aid perversity” thesis according to Goldmith? Does
he find evidence to support this? China and Japan have longstanding historical
animosities and in recent years tensions over territorial conflicts over the East China Sea
have risen. Why does Katz claim that trade will limit conflict between China and Japan?
How, if at all, does China’s threat to cut off rare earth metals to Japan make you reassess
Katz’s argument? Was China’s use of its rare earth monopoly successful? Does Russia
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have an oil and gas weapon, and how should one measure the cost of using it, and assess
its relative success? Froman, former USTR makes an argument about why the TPP was
in the US strategic interest. Do you agree?
FEB. 20
CLASS 5
TOOLS OF STATECRAFT III: STRATEGIC
BOMBING
Robert Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Chapters 1 and 2,
pp. 12-86, and the 1991 Iraq case, pp. 211 to 254.
Karl P. Mueller, Jefrey Martini, and Thomas Hamilton, “Airpower Options for Syria”
Rand Corporation, 2013.
Angela Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria” Foreign Affairs, 2016.
Recommended:
Aaron Belkin et all, “When is Strategic bombing Effective? Domestic Legitimacy and
Aerial Denial. Security Studies, 11, no 4 (Summer 2002) p. 51-88.
Daryl G. Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of
Warfare” International Security, vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2000) pp. 5-44.
A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo” International
Security, Vol. 27, No 3, (Winter 2002/03), pp. 124-157.
Key Questions: Pape argues that coercive airpower takes two different forms:
punishment and denial. What is the difference in logic underlying these two strategies
and which one does he contend is more effective? Why? What is the logic of
decapitation? One of the key difficulty in evaluating the relative effectiveness of air
power as an instrument of statecraft is isolating its influence from the threat of
conventional war. How does Pape contend this can be done? What are the different
policy objectives that the Rand study considers and how effectively do they contend
airpower can achieve them? What are the U.S. objectives in Syria? How would it rank
them and to what extent are they compatible or competing? What are Russia’s policy
objectives and how are they seeking to achieve them? Which Syrian and other regional
actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia) are targets of the U.S. and Russian influence attempts, and
what they trying to influence them to do?
FEB. 27
CLASS 6
TOOLS OF STATECRAFT IV: TARGETED
KILLINGS & PROPAGANDA
**Midterm handed out
Ward Thomas, “Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination”
International Security, vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000) pp. 105-133.
Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder on Targeted Killings, 2013.
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Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (CA: Sage
Publications, 1992), pp. 1-35; 212-228.
Russia Propaganda in Crimea: How does it Work? The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propagandamedia.
March 6 No Class Spring Break, students should work on midterm and gathering
data for their policy papers
MARCH 13 CLASS 7
CONTEXT
**Midterm Due

STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL

Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 1 & 2, pp. 1-77.
Key Questions:
Discuss the overarching strategic vision of your case. What is its international context
and how does that constrain or incentivize different strategic options?
MARCH 20 CLASS 8
STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC
CONTEXT
*1 page paper proposal due.
Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 3, pp. 1-77.
Key Questions:
What are the key domestic factors influencing your strategy?
MARCH 27 CLASS 9
STRATEGY: INTERESTS, THREATS,
OPPORTUNTIES & POWER
Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 4&5, pp. 123-206.
Key Questions: What are your country’s objectives? Be prepared to justify the
objectives, list them in order of priority and justify the ordering.
*Paper outline due
APRIL 3
POWER

CLASS 10 STRATEGIC PLANNING: INSTRUMENTS OF STATE

7

Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 6, pp. 207-280.
Key Questions: what instruments of state power will you use to achieve your objectives?
How will you use them? By what mechanisms are they designed to achieve your
objectives?
APRIL 10
CLASS 11
STRATEGY

LINKING ENDS AND MEANS & EVALUATING

Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 7&8, pp. 281-359.
Key Questions: by what precise linkages is your strategy supposed to achieve your
desired objectives? How will your target (s) react? Can you environs scenarios in which
your proposed actions have an alternative affect? Are there back up plans for such
contingencies?
APRIL 17

CLASS 12

STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

APRIL 24

CLASS 13

STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

MAY 1

CLASS 14

STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

MAY 8

CLASS 15

STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

8

